TC Earnings Call

In academia, one hears of ten-o’clock scholars. In the hurly-burly world of molybdenum speculation, it’s 10:40 AM-o’clock would-be metals analysts. I was not finished preparing Friday morning’s dynamics lecture, and so I wasn’t live on the line for Thompson Creek’s 5:30 AM earnings call. Conveniently, however, the call is online, and so I was able to listen in a day late.

TC’s 2010 full-year performance was pretty much in line with expectations. Full-year production was 32.6 million pounds of mol, costing an average of $6.07 a pound to dig out of the ground and process, and selling for an average of $15.67 per pound. Net income was $113.7 million using generally accepted accounting principles. TC has a slew of outstanding warrants priced in Canadian dollars, which are treated as derivative exposure using US accounting rules. They take a big bite out of the official bottom line. I have not had time to fully understand the underlying story, but I do intend to look in more detail at exactly what’s going on with those bad boys. Non-GAAP net profit for the year was $163.3 million, and $34.4 million for the fourth quarter.

The most interesting part of the call is the Q/A session following the canned presentation. There is a lot of talk about the effect of price inflation on capital expenditures. TC is building out at full bore on both an expansion of the Endako mine, and also on the Mt. Milligan copper-gold project. With metals prices up across the board, there is heavy competition for skilled workers, which drives up Cap-X. Oil’s going up, and ironically, so is the price of steel. TC had 316 mil in the bank at the start of the year. They expect to spend all that, plus all their profits for the year, and are talking about going out on the credit markets for even more dough. It’s clear why they don’t pay a dividend. “Look, dude, it takes money to make money.”

Valuing Adanac


Shares of Adanac Molybdenum Corporation (AUA.TO) were off 14.3% today, finishing at 0.06 USD in afternoon trading.

That headline definitely sounds more dramatic than reporting that “the stock dropped by one cent”, but sadly, the two statements are fully equivalent. Adanac spent close to 150 million in an effort to get their Ruby Creek deposit into production, but was then waylaid by the financial crisis and the attendant collapse in mol prices. The company has been reorganized, and the shareholders are scheduled to receive 3% of the equity, meaning that the 6.3 million market cap as of this afternoon’s close actually corresponds to a total company valuation of 210 million USD.

Is that reasonable?

If we the adopt the molybdenum price model developed in the last post, we’re in position to run Monte-Carlo simulations that yield a distribution of possible valuations for the company based on the projected forward trajectories of the molybdenum spot price. According to Adanac’s Oct. 21, 2008 fund-raising presentation pitched just prior to the company’s going bust, the mine will cost ~500 million USD to get up and running and consistently producing. With that capital expenditure, the mol can start flowing in two years time. The Ruby Creek deposit is capable of producing 13 million pounds of mol per year for the first five years, and then 9.5 million pounds per year for years six through nineteen. Costs in the first five years (with a higher grade of ore) are 8.10 USD/lb, increasing to 10.23 USD/lb thereafter. I assign a moderately conservative 12.5% rate, and sum the discounted cash flows for the life of the mine for each Monte-Carlo trajectory to build the distribution of valuations. I also assume that if the price falls below break-even, then they can just shut down the mine with no consequences until the situation improves.

The results are somewhat encouraging. Out of 10,000 trials, the average valuation is 471 million dollars. 38% of the cases come out above a half billion dollars, 21% lie above one billion, 5% are above two billion, and 0.7% lie above three billion. Here’s the histogram of outcomes:

The risks, of course, are legion. Most importantly, as pointed out in the last post, the price model does not adequately incorporate the surges in production by FCX et al. (and the ensuing collapse in prices) that will likely occur in the event of a sustained price spike. Next step is to get that effect into the model and re-run the code. Nevertheless, the current stock price might have some upside potential. I’m going to hold onto my 150 dollar “research grade” position…

More on the mol-neutral strategy

Molybdenum prices, along with those of all the rest of the commodities, are holding up quite well. The Metals Week average price is 17.40 USD/lb (as of Jan 31, 2011), and the Ryan’s Notes average (as of Feb 1) is 17.50 USD/lb. At those prices, a molybdenum mine is the same thing as a mint.

Last week’s post encapsulated the speculation that deep pockets, deep reserves, and current production are keys to success in the molybdenum business. More than any other player, Freeport McMoran (FCX) seems to be firing on all three cylinders (with TC doing just fine as well, thankyouverymuch).

A look at the mol price graph in 2008 shows that where molybdenum is concerned, past performance is not necessarily a solid indication of future performance. Indeed, when one looks at forward looking estimates by the producers themselves, it seems that those in the know tend to focus on how operations hold up at 10 USD/lb. Rather than being a long-at-all-costs molybdenum “bug”, a better investment strategy might be to design a long-short “molybdenum-neutral” portfolio that focuses on finding out-performance, that is, mol sector alpha.

From the molybdenum investor’s standpoint, the difficulty with FCX is that its mol business is buried within a much larger metals set-up. As of the recent 2010 annual statement, FCX’s revenues were 3.9e+9 lbs x 3.59 USD/lb = 1.4e+10 USD from Cu, 1.4e+6 oz x 1271 USD/oz = 1.7e+9 USD from AU, and 6.7e+7 lbs x 16.47 USD/lb = 1.1e+9 USD from Mo. On a revenue basis, then, FCX is 83% Cu, 10% Au, and 7% Mo (which sounds like the perfect alloy for a gleaming 10 lb paperweight on the trading desk of a heavy-hitting molybdenum speculator).

Last week’s model portfolio sought to isolate the relative outperformance of FCX’s mol business by (1) going long 100K FCX, and going (2) short 83K worth of COPX (copper producer index ETF), and (3) short 10K worth of GDX (gold producer index ETF). The net 7K of FCX is, in theory, “all mol”, and this 7K of exposure is in turn balanced against a short 7K position in General Moly (GMO), who are currently working to get Nevada’s Mt. Hope deposit into production. An even better strategy would be to short 7K worth of Adanac and Roca Mines, but I’m guessing that it’d be difficult to get the locates on the shares.

The plan last week was to implement the mol-neutral strategy on the onging VSE UCSC Capitalism Club stock contest. Sadly, due to some technical difficulties on VSE’s side, the COPX and GDX trades failed to clear, and I was left 93% long FCX. On Friday, I issued a “stop gain” order to cut my advance to  up a mere 4% on the week. We’ll try again next week by issuing an order to go (1) long 1,763 shares FCX, (2) short 4,067 shares  COPX, (3) short 178 shares GDX, and (4) short 1,277 shares GMO.

As pointed out last week, this portfolio would be a total failure as a real-world product. It chews up a huge amount of margin. For a mere 7K of FCX-GMO molybdenum alpha, one ties up ~200,000 USD of capital (or similar depending on specific brokerage rules). Also, in constructing the product, I assume that FCX’s copper and gold businesses have a beta of one to the respective producer indices — almost certainly not the case. The error in this assumption is exacerbated by the huge fraction of FCX that’s tied up in the copper business.

Looks like I need to work with an investment bank to structure a special product…

A mol-neutral strategy


Source: Climax Molybdenum.

The 2010 earnings call makes it pretty clear that when it comes to mol, Freeport-McMoran is calling at least some of the shots.

Now let’s be realistic and get a full disclosure out in front: having written a molybdenum research web log on an erratically part-time basis for one month in no way qualifies me as a molybdenum expert. In particular, I don’t yet have any understanding for the demand side of the molybdenum market, which appears to be high-beta to the economy in general and to China in particular. So as of yet, I have no mechanism for predicting the spot price of mol a year out, two years out, five years out.

One thing that does seem plausible, however, is that the FCX molybdenum business has structural advantages over junior molybdenum miners such as General Moly, Roca Mines, Adanac et al. who are individually scrambling to either bring a new project on line, or ramp up production, or reorganize following bankruptcy. The junior miners face vagaries of financing, regulatory hurdles, single-point failure modes, etc. FCX, on the other hand is printing billions of dollars, has 60 billion dollars worth of mol reserves sitting in the ground and essentially no debt, and can bring the Climax mine into production more or less at will.

As an exercise, it’s interesting to construct a portfolio that attempts to (1) isolate the molybdenum business from the much larger Cu-Au section of FCX, and (2) is (to zeroth-order) “mol neutral” in that it is long FCX molybdenum, and short the junior mol miners.

Specifically, to achieve USD 10,000 exposure to pure FCX mol, we go (i) long 938 shares FCX, (ii) short 4398 shares COPX, (iii) short 185 shares GDX, and (iv) short 2000 shares GMO. As of the market close on 1/28/2011, this portfolio is long-short balanced.

UCSC Grad Student Neil Miller has been running a stock-market contest on the Virtual Stock Exchange (Game id: UCSC_Club). I’m currently in 4th place out of 48 players, as a result of a strategy that during December of ’10 went long TC and short CRM. I guess I’m ol’ fashioned, but I like companies that make a lot of money relative to their share price. I took the strategy off at the beginning of ’11, just after TC jumped upward on the (partial) basis of the rare-Earth confusion. As of 1/28/2011, I’m sitting on a 16.43% return, and my book’s off:

Time for another full disclosure: At the start of the contest, on Nov. 1, 2010, I threw caution to the wind, and put my whole book into a leveraged short position on LIZ.

Now, while this position would now be up enough to have me in first place in the contest, I got hit with a succession of margin calls during LIZ’s inexplicable late-November run-up, and Neil deleted my account:

After successfully losing 40 percent of his account within the first month of trading, user greglaughlin has been found to have insufficient margin for 5 consecutive market closes on November 30th and account was promptly deleted as promised.

(So, as is often the case when genius fails, I was fully recapitalized without suffering any particular personal penalty or loss.)

I’ve submitted orders to put on the above mol-neutral “Climax” strategy at the market open tomorrow (Jan 31, 2011). It’s certainly not optimally engineered: no accounting of the various betas has been incorporated, and it chews up a hell of a lot of margin for a mere 10K of FCX-Climax-outperformance exposure. Nevertheless, I bet it will outperform its inverse position, so I’m putting no money where my mouth is!

Report card

Here’s the comparative performance over the past year for four effectively pure play mol names: Adanac (AUAYF, market cap 10M), Roca Mines (ROK, market cap 42M), Thompson Creek (TC, 2.3B), and General Moly (GMO, market cap 408M), along with XLB (basic materials SPDR ETF):

GMO won 2010, hands down. The stock price of this name is doing well because they’ve got clear (Chinese-sourced) bridge financing in place and a good shot at bringing the Mt. Hope mine in Nevada on line. With its projected 40 million pounds per year of mol production, Mt Hope wouldn’t exactly be the best news for TC. Still not sure what’s up with Adanac’s recent flurry of stock trading activity. If Roca Mines 2010 3rd-quarter report is any indication, ROK hasn’t exactly been taking their MAX mine to the max as of late.

Roca and Adanac don’t have associated exchange-traded options, but TC and GMO do. Here, courtesy of ivolatility.com, are one-year time-series plots of realized and implied vol for TC and GMO:


GMO is trading at 80% implied vol, while TC is trading at 50%. I think it might be interesting to investigate trades that short GMO vol and hedge with TC vol. The vol’s all mol after all…

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